We illustrate how an information sender may use unveri¯able signals regarding a set of substitute products located in an alternative market to manipulate the choices made by uninformed but perfectly rational decision makers (DMs) within the veri¯able market where the information sender operates. We do so by de¯ning an optimal information gathering structure for rational DMs who acquire information sequentially from a set of multidimensional products. The resulting strategic signaling environment delivers two main results that are illustrated numerically. First, in order for the sender to successfully manipulate the information gathering and choice behavior of DMs, he should release signals on characteristics that di®er from their most preferred ones. Second, the capacity of the sender to manipulate the behavior of DMs depends negatively on his reputation regarding the expected value of the unobserved characteristics guaranteed to DMs within the market where he operates. Normative applications to online search environments conditioned by the provision of strategic reviews in social media are presented.
Introduction
The main objective of the current paper is to illustrate how an information sender may use unveri¯able signals regarding a set of substitute products located in an alternative market to manipulate the choices made by rational decision makers (DMs) from a set of veri¯able products. In order to do so, the paper deals with and merges two di®erent research lines linked by their respective analyses of the optimal information acquisition processes of rational DMs. In particular, the information gathering algorithmic environment de¯ned in this paper relates to the consumer choice literature and the decision theoretical branch of economics and operations research.
On sequential information acquisition
Consider the problem faced by a rational DM regarding what information to gather given a limited capacity to do so. The consumer choice literature studies this problem mainly from a psychological perspective, in particular when dealing with the strategic side of the information transmission process de¯ning the choices made by consumers. In this case, this research line focuses on how the information given to DMs can be strategically designed to a®ect their¯nal choice in a way that some predetermined options appear more attractive than others. Particularly relevant in this respect are the framing mechanisms that may be employed by the information sender, 1 together with the overemphasis placed by DMs on the information acquired over that expected. 2 Some empirical phenomena identi¯ed by this research line include, among many others, the existence of context e®ects allowing for modi¯cations in the preference formation process of DMs, 3 guided search mechanisms implemented through screening tools, used, for example, in electronic shopping, 4 and the generation and transmission of super°uous information, 5 with its corresponding additional processing requirements on the DM. These e®ects, together with the limited cognitive ability of DMs to assimilate information, allow for choice modi¯cations to be induced through their information gathering process.
The previous research line sets the empirical base for the development of the corresponding search theoretical economic models that analyze fads and herds as rational phenomena, following the seminal works of Refs. 6 and 7. These models deal with the in°uence that informative signals have on the optimal (and rational) behavior of the DMs receiving them. However, studying the in°uence that information transmission processes, and signals in particular, have on the optimal information gathering behavior and choice structures of DMs remains outside the main scope of this research line, refer to Ref. 8 for a comprehensive review of the literature.
In summary, the e®ect that information transmission processes [signals] have on the choice [strategic] behavior of DMs within a given equilibrium system has been empirically [formally] analyzed by the consumer choice [economic] research line. The design and study of algorithmic information acquisition processes remains outside their scope but within that of the operations research literature, which, at the same time, tends to overlook the strategic implications that di®erent signaling and preference manipulation strategies have for the information gathering and choice behavior of DMs.
As a matter of fact, the management/operations research literature has been considering the optimal information gathering problem of¯rm managers for quite some time, refer to the seminal models of Refs. 9 and 10. However, and despite the inclusion of Bayesian learning mechanisms into their algorithms, even the most recent models omit the strategic choice e®ects inherent to the information transmission process, see Refs. 11-13 for a comprehensive review of the literature. This research line remains focused on the importance that search costs have in limiting the information processing capacity of generally risk neutral DMs when deciding whether to continue or stop their search within settings de¯ned by the adoption of a given technology.
Finally, a substantial amount of the information sciences literature dealing with decision-making processes has highlighted the imprecision existing in the evaluation capacities of DMs within uncertain environments with limited (and imprecise) information. 14, 15 This branch of the literature provides alternatives to standard expected utility theory and its main variants, such as prospect theory, which constitute the dominant approach to the subject of decision making under uncertainty among economists. 16, 17 For example, Ref. 18 use quantum probabilities to measure the e®ect that shared mutual information has on the decision-making process of socially interacting agents.
Strategic transmission of information in the economics literature
Consider the basic behavioral principle de¯ning bounded rationality: DMs are driven by heuristic (satis¯cing) mechanisms that simplify their information acquisition and assimilation processes. 19 This principle applies due to the inability of DMs to acquire and process all the information required to make fully informed rational decisions when subject to environmental and time constraints. Thus, given the limited capacity of DMs to analyze all the information available, the process of information transmission remains open to manipulation by self-interested agents. This type of asymmetric information environment was considered by Ref. 20 , with his analysis being performed on products de¯ned by a unique characteristics. A related though more recent model is presented by Ref. 21 .
The main problem arising in asymmetric information environments is that the knowledge of the uninformed DMs can be modi¯ed and their preferences altered by interested third parties. This is due to the fact that the priorities and preferences of the information senders may di®er from those of the agents acquiring the information. [22] [23] [24] There exist several examples of this strategic preference alteration process in the literature. For example, Ref. 25 show that uninformed agents are especially susceptible to information from interested and third parties when deciding whether Choice Manipulation Through Comparability 341 or not to purchase genetically modi¯ed food. A compensation mechanism that follows from the resulting strategic interactions among agents consists of lowering the reputation of manipulative senders after the DMs verify the information and recommendations received. Reference 26 describe the optimal way to transmit reputation information while being constrained by one main product characteristic.
Strategic transmission of information in social media
The literature on consumer (information acquisition and choice) behavior and the strategic one regarding information transmission in economics interact when analyzing the strategic transmission of information in social media.
Social media constitute a highly important strategic device determining consumer decisions. Online reviews have become increasingly popular as a mechanism to judge the quality of various products and services. 27 The transmission of online opinions through electronic word-of-mouth on websites such as Yelp and Tripadvisor is generally motivated by the reputation and social status achieved by the reviewer together with the enjoyment derived from helping and in°uencing other consumers. [28] [29] [30] A similar approach applies when considering books, with readers generally checking book reviews written by others. 31 However, recent work demonstrates that the absence of reporting incentives leads to a biased set of reviews that may not re°ect the true quality of a given product. 32 Reference 27 study both reporting incentives and biases observed in the Tripadvisor website and conclude that the ratings given by users partly re°ect the di®erence between the true quality of the product and their prior expectations as inferred from previous reviews. In this regard, Ref. 33 examine netnographic evidence to analyze the way in which rankings such as those of TripAdvisor generate trust. A review of the literature on the models of trust proposed to assess the credibility of peers in an open multi-agent system environment is presented by Ref. 34 .
At the same time, as the paradox of choice states, the information and cognitive overload faced by DMs when considering all reviews and evaluations available may lead to worse decisions. 35 In such a situation, DM tend to rely more on heuristics than rationality to arrive at information acquisition and purchase decisions. For example, a common heuristic mechanism is de¯ned in terms of satis¯cing criteria, with DMs comparing each attribute value of a given product with a predetermined cut-of level and rejecting alternatives that do not meet it. In this regard, Ref. 36 illustrate how positive information plays an important role in the choice process of DMs when a relatively large number of aspects is considered, while negative experiences become more important when products are de¯ned by a limited number of relevant characteristics.
Main results obtained
Consider a situation where a DM is allowed to check a number of characteristics from a set of multidimensional products. The search process must therefore be de¯ned both \between-attributes" and \between-alternatives". 37 We analyze and compare the cases where the information acquisition process is based on the possibility of collecting two and three pieces of information. The evolution of the information acquisition process described in the paper depends directly on the values of all the characteristics observed previously by a DM and their potential combinations with those expected to be observed. This property limits the dimension of the products that may be considered by a DM and prevents the use of standard dynamic programming techniques in the design of the algorithm.
At the same time, the decision theoretical model is extended to account for the reception of publicly observable signals within a standard Bayesian learning setting. The introduction of signals within the current multi-attribute information gathering framework allows for possible generalizations of Ref. 6 \restaurant" herding model with sequential moves and publicly observable signals to start being considered. Though important di®erences exist with respect to Banerjee's model, in particular regarding the quality of the signals received, the introduction of multidimensional products and additional decision variables allows us to account explicitly for the e®ects that di®erent types of signals and learning processes have on the optimal information gathering behavior of DMs. Moreover, allowing for subjective interpretations of the signals by DMs and accounting for the resulting e®ects on their information acquisition and choice behavior would link the current paper directly to the branch of the information sciences literature analyzing decision-making processes.
We illustrate how the willingness to search of DMs is in°uenced by the reception of credible signals de¯ned on the distribution of unveri¯able characteristics within an alternative market. That is, we show how this type of signals can be issued so as to manipulate the choices made by uninformed but perfectly rational DMs within the veri¯able market where the information sender operates. In particular, we present several numeral simulations illustrating how signals should be released on characteristics di®erent from the most preferred ones among DMs. Otherwise, the information sender would be unable to manipulate the information gathering process of DMs in the desired direction. Moreover, it follows from our formal and numerical analysis that the capacity of the sender to manipulate the information gathering and choice behavior of DMs depends negatively on his reputation regarding the expected value of the unobserved characteristics guaranteed to DMs within the market where he operates.
We have already dealt with the topic of preference manipulation by an informed sender in a previous paper. 38 However, our previous setting di®ers signi¯cantly from the current one, with the main di®erence between both consisting of the ability of the sender to impose any product on the DM independently of the value of the realization of the DM's most preferred characteristic. Clearly, in order for these normative results to be considered, positive support is required illustrating whether or not DMs do actually compare the characteristics of products located in di®erent markets and choose according to their relative value. In this regard, Refs. 39 and 40 presents empirical evidence providing the required support for our comparability assumption.
Regarding its applicability, the current paper provides a normative approach to the behavior of consumers in online purchasing settings, where Google constitutes the main search engine used by DMs. 41 The prioritized page order in which search results are displayed gives place to di®erent markets on which DMs de¯ne their information acquisition processes. In this case, the current model applies a selection mechanism determining the information acquisition behavior of DMs when shifting among di®erent displayed alternatives both within and among result pages as different observations are acquired. Thus, the most popular options displayed within the¯rst result pages constitute a market on which di®erent negative signals may be issued in the form of initially unveri¯able reviews on a subset of product characteristics. These signals a®ect the information acquisition and choice behavior of DMs while being issued by agents whose reputation is exogenously determined online.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 deals with the standard notation and basic assumptions needed to develop the model. Section 3 de¯nes the expected search utility functions, while Sec. 4 introduces the corresponding Bayesian learning processes. Section 5 illustrates numerically the main results obtained. Section 6 analyzes the information acquisition process of DMs when considering products de¯ned by three characteristics. Section 7 summarizes the main¯ndings and suggests possible extensions.
Basic Notations and Main Assumptions
The algorithmic structure described through the paper must be rede¯ned after each observation is gathered by the DM and recalculated in terms of all previously observed variables, their sets of potential combinations with newly acquired observations and the corresponding expected payo®s. This requisite leads to the low dimensionality of the model and can be justi¯ed by the limited information as similation and memory capacities with which DMs are endowed when comparing products within and between di®erent markets. In addition, the literature usually concentrates on a small number of attributes when describing the products available to consumers, i.e., performance and cheapness in the case of Ref. 42 and variety and quality in the case of Ref. 43 .
It may initially seem that allowing DMs to acquire only two or three observations per product imposes a considerable constraint on the set of information available online, despite the paradox of choice described in Introduction. It should be however noted that observations do not necessarily account for a unique property of the product, but a series of them whose combination de¯nes a characteristic element to which a numerical evaluation and a subjective probability function have been assigned. For example, when considering the choice of a restaurant the¯rst characteristic could be de¯ned as category and include location, number of stars, and menu complexity, while the second characteristic set may include the range of wines in the list together with prices and be de¯ned as a®ordability, see, for example, Chapter 2 in Ref. 44 .
The basic model described through Secs. 2 and 3 corresponds to the one introduced by Ref. 45 , whose main components have been restated here.
Let X be a nonempty set and % a preference relation de¯ned on X. A utility function representing a preference relation % on X is a function u : X ! R such that: 8 x; y 2 X; x % y () uðxÞ ! uðyÞ:
ð2:1Þ
The symbol ! denotes the standard partial order on the reals. When X R and % coincides with !, we say that u is a utility function on X. Let G denote the set of all products and¯x n 2 N . For every i n, let X i represent the set of all possible variants for the ith characteristic of any product in G and X stand for the Cartesian product Q i n X i . Thus, every product in G is described by an n-tuple hx 1 ; . . . ; x n i in X. X i is called the ith characteristic factor space, while X stands for the characteristic space.
Following the classical approach to information demand by economic agents, 46 we restrict our attention to the case where each X i is identi¯ed with a compact and connected nondegenerate real subinterval of ½0; þ1Þ. The topology and the preferThe probability densities 1 ; . . . ; n must be interpreted as the subjective \beliefs" of the DM. For i n, i ðY i Þ is the subjective probability that a randomly observed product from G displays an element x i 2 Y i X i as its ith characteristic. c Following the standard economic theory of choice under uncertainty, we assume that the DM elicits the ith certainty equivalent value induced by the subjective probability density i and the utility function u i as the reference point against which to compare the information collected on the ith characteristic of a certain product.
Given i n, the certainty equivalent of i and u i , denoted by ce i , is a characteristic in X i that the DM is indi®erent to accept in place of the expected one to be obtained through i and u i . That is, for every i n, ce i ¼ u
À1
i ðE i Þ, where E i denotes the expected value of u i . The existence and uniqueness of the ith certainty equivalent value ce i are guaranteed by the continuity and strict increasingness of u i , respectively.
Expected Search Utilities
The set of all products, G, is identi¯ed with a compact and convex subset of the n-dimensional real space R n . In the simplest nontrivial scenario, G consists of at least two products and the DM is allowed to collect two pieces of information, not necessarily from the same product. That is, once the value of the¯rst characteristic from one of the products becomes known to the DM, she has to decide whether to check the second characteristic from the same product, or to check the¯rst characteristic from a di®erent product. Henceforth, we denote by A and B the two products that can be randomly checked by the DM.
We show below that the decision of how to allocate the second available piece of information depends on two real-valued functions de¯ned on X 1 . The DM considers the sum E 1 þ E 2 , corresponding to the expected utility values of the pairs hu 1 ; 1 i and hu 2 ; 2 i, as the main reference value when calculating both these functions.
Assume that the DM has already checked the¯rst characteristic from product A and that she uses her remaining information piece to observe the second characteristic from A. In this case, the expected utility gain over E 1 þ E 2 varies with the value x 1 observed for the¯rst characteristic. For every x 1 2 X 1 , let
ð3:2Þ P þ ðx 1 Þ and P À ðx 1 Þ de¯ne the set of values for the second x 2 characteristic from product A such that their combination with the observed¯rst x 1 characteristic delivers a respectively higher or lower-equal utility than a randomly chosen product from G.
Let F : X 1 ! R be de¯ned by:
ð3:3Þ
Fðx 1 Þ describes the DM's expected utility derived from checking the second characteristic x 2 of product A after observing that the value of the¯rst characteristic is given by x 1 . Note that, if u 2 ðx 2 Þ þ u 1 ðx 1 Þ E 1 þ E 2 , then choosing a product from G randomly delivers an expected utility of E 1 þ E 2 to the DM, which is higher than the expected utility obtained from choosing product A, that is,
Consider now the expected utility that the DM could gain over E 1 þ E 2 if the second available piece of information is employed to observe the¯rst characteristic from product B. For every x 1 2 X 1 , let
and
Q þ ðx 1 Þ and Q À ðx 1 Þ de¯ne the set of values for the¯rst y 1 characteristic from product B such that they deliver a respectively higher or lower-equal utility than the maximum between the observed¯rst x 1 characteristic from product A and a randomly chosen product from G.
De¯ne H : X 1 ! R as follows:
ð3:6Þ
H ðx 1 Þ describes the expected utility obtained from checking the¯rst characteristic y 1 of product B after having already observed the value of the¯rst characteristic x 1 from product A. If u 1 ðy 1 Þ maxfu 1 ðx 1 Þ; E 1 g, then the DM must choose between A and a randomly chosen product from G, delivering an expected utility of E 1 .
Finally, note that the domain of both F and H is the support of 1 .
Existence of optimal thresholds
Clearly, the expected utility functions Fðx 1 Þ and H ðx 1 Þ guide the DM's optimal information gathering process. Assume that the information search on product A has produced x 1 as¯rst result. Then, the DM will choose to continue checking product A or switching to product B depending on which function, either Fðx 1 Þ or H ðx 1 Þ, takes the highest value at x 1 . It may also happen that she is indi®erent between continuing with A and switching to B. It is reasonable to think of these indi®erence values as optimal information gathering thresholds. Thus, X 1 turns out to be partitioned in subintervals whose values induce the DM either to continue checking the initial product A or to switch and start checking B. 
Signals and Learning Processes
The current section de¯nes the optimal information gathering behavior of DMs when an information sender issues credible signals regarding changes in the expected characteristics of substitute products existing in markets that cannot be directly observed by the DM. The [information] sender is unable to manipulate the choices made by DMs directly due to the veri¯ability of the characteristics being displayed. The sender may however a®ect the information gathering and choice processes of DMs by releasing unveri¯able signals regarding substitute products located in alternative markets. This would actually be the case if DMs allow for the reference points of the observable characteristics to be compared with those of unobservable products when gathering both observations. We will study four di®erent scenarios depending on the type of signal issued by the sender, either positive or negative, and the characteristic to which signals relate.
First, we consider the release of positive and negative signals by the information sender. We start by analyzing the e®ects that positive signals regarding the distribution of characteristics on X i , i ¼ 1; 2, and the resulting learning process have on the optimal information gathering behavior of rational DMs. Consider, as the basic reference case and without loss of generality, the optimal information gathering behavior of the DM when uniform probabilities are assumed on both X 1 and X 2 . e We will assume that receiving a credible positive signal, , regarding the distribution of characteristics on X i implies that the probability mass accumulated on the lower half of the distribution halves. At the same time, the probability mass eliminated from the lower half of the distribution is shifted to the upper one. Thus, given the distribution of X i characteristics de¯ned by i ðx i Þ ¼ 1 À for x i 2 ½; , with ; ! 0 and < , the corresponding conditional density function is given by
ð4:1Þ
d Reference 45 illustrate how the existence of optimal threshold values, or reversing points, in the DM's information gathering process can be guaranteed under common nonpathological assumptions. For example, it can be easily shown that H ðx
su±ces to guarantee the existence of at least one threshold value whenever P þ ðx m 1 Þ ¼ ;. e Even though we will only study the e®ects resulting from signals for the uniform density case de¯ned in the paper, the analysis could be generalized to any other density function whose probability mass is redistributed to generate either higher or lower E 1 and E 2 values.
After receiving a positive signal, rational DMs update their initial beliefs, given by i ðx i Þ, following Bayes' rule. Therefore, if a signal is received, i.e., ¼ 1, the updated beliefs of DMs will be given by
Negative signals shift the probability mass in the opposite direction, that is, towards the lower end of the distribution. This case follows trivially from the positive setting, with the only modi¯cation taking place through the conditional density function, which in the negative signal case would be given by
with the same Bayesian updating process following as in the positive case. The updated i ðx i Þ density generated by the signal(s) modi¯es the Fðx 1 Þ and H ðx 1 Þ functions through the new induced values of the corresponding E i variables, with
The second type of scenario under consideration relates to the variable on which signals are issued. There are two possibilities, signals may be released on either X 1 or X 2 . In both cases, DMs are unable to verify the validity of the signals, but these may a®ect their information gathering processes. This scenario is designed to di®erentiate between the characteristics that are immediately observable by the DM, such as X 1 , and the experience type quality of X 2 , which can only be veri¯ed if the DM sticks to the initially observed product.
The classi¯cation described above allows us to de¯ne new FðÁÞ and H ðÁÞ functions based on the type of signal observed and the characteristic on which it is de¯ned. The following de¯nitions will be used through the next section when introducing numerical simulations to analyze the e®ects of the signals on the behavior of DMs.
The characteristics conditioned by the reception of positive and negative signals will be denoted by x i and x i , i ¼ 1; 2, respectively. Similarly, the corresponding expected utilities will be denoted by E 1 and E 2 . It should be emphasized that these utilities correspond to the products located in an alternative [unveri¯able] market, not to the veri¯able ones located within the market on which the sender operates.
f This process can be assumed to continue as rational DMs keep on updating their beliefs using Bayes' rule after receiving further signals. For example, a second signal, providing DMs with the same qualitative information, i.e., ¼ 2, would lead to a second Bayesian updating process and the following distribution of beliefs on X i
Choice Manipulation Through Comparability 349
Receiving a positive signal on the¯rst characteristic of a set of products located in an alternative market leads to the following updated P þ ðÁÞ and P À ðÁÞ sets
An identical logic applies when accounting for the reception of a negative signal, x 1 , or a signal on X 2 . Clearly, the exact same e®ect is induced through the P þ ðÁÞ and P À ðÁÞ sets on the FðÁÞ function after a signal is observed on either X 1 or X 2
ð4:6Þ
Note that, even though one may intuitively expect positive and negative signals to have opposite e®ects on the FðÁÞ function, this is actually not the case, as we will illustrate numerically in the next section. However, when considering the H ðÁÞ function, we will observe that positive and negative signals on X 1 have opposite e®ects through the corresponding Q þ ðÁÞ and Q À ðÁÞ sets
ð4:9Þ
and similarly for x 1 . We will illustrate and elaborate on these results through the numerical simulations of the next section. As already stated, E 1 remains unmodi¯ed within the corresponding de¯nitions of the FðÁÞ and H ðÁÞ functions, as it is part of the unsignaled market where the sender operates. Only the integration limits, which are determined by the expectations about the alternative market, are modi¯ed by the signals issued by the sender. Consider now the reception of either a positive or a negative signal on the second characteristic of a set of products located in an alternative market. As stated above, the e®ects on the FðÁÞ function that take place through modi¯cations of the P þ ðÁÞ and P À ðÁÞ sets are identical to those derived from observing signals on X 1 . We will make use of the following notation to distinguish between both cases, though it should be clear that the variable de¯ning the information gathering behavior of the DM remains the observed X 1 characteristic within the so-called unsignaled market
ð4:12Þ
and similarly for (x 1 jx 2 ). As was the case in the X 1 scenario, the value of E 2 de¯ned within FðÁÞ that determines the corresponding expected utility when searching within the unsignaled market is not modi¯ed. Finally, it should be evident that signals issued on the value of X 2 expected to be obtained in an alternative market do not have any e®ect on the Q þ ðÁÞ and Q À ðÁÞ sets and, therefore, on the corresponding H ðÁÞ functions.
Even though we could formally analyze the e®ect that signals have on the FðÁÞ and H ðÁÞ functions in the current section, we will provide a more intuitive presentation via numerical simulations in the following one. Besides providing some intuition regarding the evaluation of the shifts in the FðÁÞ and H ðÁÞ functions, we will study the e®ect that signals have on the behavior of the optimal thresholds, which cannot be derived analytically as it depends on the relative strength of the shifts taking place in the corresponding functions.
Manipulability and Market Comparability
This section presents a numerical analysis of the comparative signaling scenario described in the previous one. We will analyze the e®ects on the optimal information gathering and choice behavior of DMs derived from the unveri¯able signals issued by the sender regarding the probability distributions de¯ned on the characteristics of products located in alternative markets. Given the analysis presented in the previous section, we will assume that DMs update their expectations after observing a credible signal and modify their original Fðx 1 Þ and H ðx 1 Þ functions accordingly.
That is, signals issued regarding the characteristics of products whose expected utility is modi¯ed in an alternative market a®ect the information acquisition behavior of DMs within the current veri¯able market. The expected utility of the products located in the market where the information sender operates remains unchanged, but the comparability between products located in di®erent markets modi¯es the behavior of DMs. 5, 28 We have studied formally the framework where credible signals are issued on the market where the DMs operate in Refs. 48 and 49. However, the models described in these papers adapt better to an environment dealing with the introduction of technologically superior products by competinḡ rms, such as that of Ref. 50 . In this case, the resulting submarkets arising as a result of the signals de¯ne the information acquisition behavior of DMs based on the characteristics of the products expected to be obtained within them.
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On the other hand, when relying on social media, DMs do not only consider the characteristics of the products located within the market where the information sender operates, but also alternative ones on which information is issued. It is the change in the expected utility derived from shifting to an alternative market what generates modi¯cations in the threshold values of DMs within the market where they are performing their search.
For example, when choosing a restaurant within a given area of a city that the DM is visiting, we are assuming that the DM does not only consider the social media reviews of the restaurant where he could have lunch right away, but that opinions on alternative ones will have an e®ect on the resulting choice. While positive opinions will generally lead to stricter continuation criteria on the initial alternative, the e®ect of negative initially unveri¯able ones may be considered when DMs face a small number of characteristics per alternative. 36 Note that the information sender wants the DM to acquire a second piece of information on its restaurant as opposed to directly rejecting it and continuing with another option within the same or a close by area to where the restaurant is located.
Note also that the initial (sub)market faced by DMs consists of the results obtained from the corresponding online search engine used to retrieve information. Online rating websites and other social media provide additional information not only about the option being considered by the DM but also regarding other alternatives. It could also be assumed that the initial market faced by DMs is composed by alternatives that have received a minimum number of reviews. In this regard, all alternatives are initially equivalent within the market and therefore, unless a subjective bias is imposed on the information acquisition behavior of DMs, all the alternatives within a given market have the same probability of being chosen to start acquiring information on.
Consider, as the basic reference case, the optimal information acquisition behavior following from a standard risk neutral utility function when uniform probabilities are assumed on both X 1 and X 2 . DMs will be assumed to have a well-de¯ned preference order between the characteristics composing the products. As a result, the¯rst characteristic will be more important for DMs and, therefore, lead to a higher expected utility than the second one. The reference risk neutral case is described by the following parameter values (i) Characteristic spaces: X 1 ¼ ½5; 10, X 2 ¼ ½0; 10, (ii) Utility functions:
This case is represented in Fig. 1 by the functions H and FðnsÞ. In all¯gures, the horizontal axis represents the set of possible x 1 realizations that may be observed by the DM, with the corresponding subjective expected utility values de¯ned on the vertical axis. Positive and negative signals will be respectively denoted by gs and bs within the corresponding FðÁÞ and H ðÁÞ functions, while the number of signals observed is indicated before their type. In order to facilitate comparisons among the threshold values generated by di®erent types and number of signals the support of the corresponding signal-induced probability functions has been kept unchanged through all the simulations.
It should be highlighted that assuming risk averse DMs would modify the threshold values derived through the numerical analysis, though the main results obtained would remain qualitatively unchanged. The e®ects that di®erent degrees of risk aversion have on the threshold values computed by the corresponding DMs are illustrated numerically in Ref. 45 .
Signals on X 2
We proceed now to illustrate the e®ect that signals, either positive or negative, regarding the distribution of characteristics on X 2 in an alternative market and the resulting learning process have on the optimal information gathering behavior of rational DMs. Through this section, we will denote the value of the E i variable in the alternative market byÊ i , with i ¼ 1; 2.
The¯rst immediate result that follows from the numerical simulations presented in Fig. 1 is the identical e®ect that positive and negative signals have on the expected search utility payofs received by DMs.
g In both cases, the e®ect on the expected utility de¯ned by FðÁÞ is negative, resulting in what we will refer to as a decrease in g The identical change induced by positive and negative signals on FðÁÞ is due to the linearity of the utilities de¯ned on the characteristic spaces as well as to the symmetry of the domain and the uniformity of the probability function de¯ned on X 2 . Choice Manipulation Through Comparability 353 search aversion. That is, the area where the H ðÁÞ function remains above the FðÁÞ one increases for relatively low x 1 realizations. As a result, DMs would require relatively higher realizations from the¯rst characteristic space in order to continue gathering information on the observed product. Clearly, changes in the value ofÊ 2 do not have any e®ect on the H ðÁÞ function, which remains unaltered.
The main implication derived from this basic result is quite a strong one: a fully credible sender cannot manipulate the DM into accepting whatever product is initially displayed. In the current setting, credibility determines the ability of the sender to convince the DM to expect the certainty equivalent product from a random purchase. The formal intuition behind this result is indeed quite simple. A positive signal released on the distribution of X 2 within an alternative market, i.e., an increase in E 2 , decreases the cardinality [size] of P þ ðx 1 Þ and increases that of P À ðx 1 Þ. That is, P þ ðx 1 jx 2 Þ & P þ ðx 1 Þ and P À ðx 1 Þ & P þ ðx 1 jx 2 Þ. This is due to the higher expected utility derived from acquiring information on the alternative market, given by E 1 þÊ 2 .
Thus, a higher realization of X 2 is now required to accept a product within the unsignaled veri¯able market operated by the sender. Otherwise, the certainty equivalent product de¯ned by E 1 þ E 2 is expected to be received. As a result, the expected search utility from continuing gathering information on the observed product decreases. It may seem, following the same type of reasoning, that a negative signal onÊ 2 should increase the expected search utility derived from FðÁÞ. However, this is actually not the case. A decrease inÊ 2 leads the DM to accept products whose expected utility is below E 1 þ E 2 but above E 1 þÊ 2 . In this case, the size of the P þ ðx 1 Þ set increases but to include products leading to a lower expected utility than that derived from a random choice within the unsignaled observable market. Consequently, the FðÁÞ function shifts downwards.
Given the previous result, the obvious direction to follow consists of modifying the credibility of the sender. In this respect, we will eliminate all credibility from the sender when the DM must decide whether or not to purchase a product randomly from the unsignaled market within which the sender operates. That is, the DM will be reluctant to purchase a product unless he can observe at least one characteristic leading to a higher than the certainty equivalent utility. Thus, if the characteristics observed do not lead to a product satisfying this requirement, no purchase will take place, which results in an expected utility of zero.
The lack of credibility on the side of the information sender leads to the following de¯nitions of the expected search utilities. F : X 1 ! R will be de¯ned by
ð5:1Þ emphasizing the fact that any realizations contained within the set P À ðx 1 Þ result in an expected utility of zero. H : X 1 ! R must be divided in two di®erent parts, introducing a discontinuity in the resulting function. That is, whenever x 1 ! ce 1 we have
In this case, the DM has observed a realization of x 1 located above the certainty equivalent value. This fact guarantees the purchase of the initial (partially observed) product if the realization from the new product does not provide a su®ciently high utility. However, for all x 1 < ce 1 we have
ð5:3Þ
In this case, the DM will only consider the purchase of the new partially observed product if its¯rst characteristic provides a higher utility than the certainty equivalent one.
We will also be considering the reputation of the sender, which will be assumed to modify both the E 1 þ E 2 payo®s within FðÁÞ and E 2 within H ðÁÞ. The reputation of a sender is a variable 2 ½0; 1 that weighs the values of E 1 and E 2 expected to be obtained in the unsignaled market. The corresponding function F : X 1 ! R de¯ned for a given reputation level is therefore given by
Similarly to the lack of credibility case, modifying the reputation of the information sender generates a discontinuity in the function H : X 1 ! R, which must be again de¯ned in terms of the initial realization observed by the DM. In this case, when x 1 ! ce 1 we have
ð5:5Þ
while for x 1 < ce 1 we have
The intuition is similar to that de¯ning the functions FðÁÞ and H ðÁÞ under full credibility and reputation. Note however that reputation and credibility represent di®erent concepts. That is, a well-reputed sender is not necessarily credible when purchasing a product randomly.
h Reputation a®ects all the expected values de¯ned on the individual characteristics of the product guaranteed by the sender. Thus, h Refer, for example, to the Managerial Decision Making and Disruptive Technological Change section in Ref. 51 for several examples illustrating this point. The author shows how veri¯ability is required by the consumer base of di®erent¯rms when purchasing technologically updated versions of a product. Thus, even though a given¯rm may have a good reputation among its consumer base, veri¯ability may still be required before purchasing a product, i.e., credibility is not necessarily guaranteed ad hoc.
reputation a®ects all unobserved characteristics while the lack of credibility prevents DMs from purchasing products randomly. All potential scenarios are compared in Fig. 2 , with the lack of credibility setting being described by the nc functions while the halved reputation one that we will analyze below is denoted by rp. Note how the absence of credibility forces DMs to acquire as many initial observations as possible to try guaranteeing a product with a relatively high¯rst characteristic. At the same time, halving the reputation of the information sender leads DMs to try guaranteeing a sufciently high product on both characteristics. In this case, the incentives of DMs to continue acquiring information on the initial product observed are even higher than under full credibility, where a relatively better product is expected to be obtained from a random purchase.
It should be noted that all these scenarios emphasize the reference role played by the expectations of DMs when determining their information acquisition process. The information sender concentrates on his own capacity to impose the product initially observed to the DM independently of the realization of its¯rst characteristic. As we highlight in the conclusion, the DM may still require both characteristics to provide a utility higher than that of the certainty equivalent product before purchasing the product observed. However, issuing signals on products located in alternative markets would allow the information sender to manipulate the DM into continuing observing products that would have otherwise been immediately rejected.
Consider now the previous risk neutral environment with negative signals issued onÊ 2 and a limit case whereÊ 2 ¼ 0 [denoted by F(lim)], which is presented in Fig. 3 . As in the fully credible case, H ðÁÞ remains unaltered independently of the signals received onÊ 2 . However, within the current setting, an unobservable random purchase assigns a value of zero to E 1 þ E 2 within both FðÁÞ and H ðÁÞ. i The simulations illustrate how refraining from purchasing a product randomly has a larger negative impact on the FðÁÞ function when moving through the domain of X 1 located above the certainty equivalent value, i.e., from ce 1 to x M 1 . Clearly, as illustrated in Fig. 2 , all the X 1 realizations within this domain guarantee a value of H ðÁÞ identical to that of the full reputation environment, while FðÁÞ still faces realizations below the certainty equivalent value, due to the yet unobserved X 2 characteristic, leading to a payo® of zero.
The main conclusion to be derived from these simulations is that a decrease in credibility is required for the sender to manipulate the information gathering process of the DM in the desired direction. That is, if the sender wants the DM to consider only the product observed initially within the unsignaled market while ignoring any other search possibilities, then unveri¯able signals released onÊ 2 become increasingly e±cient as his credibility decreases. This is due to the fact that, within the current setting, the increase in the number of realizations contained in P þ ðx 1 jx 2 Þ ' P þ ðx 1 Þ does actually lead to an upper shift of FðÁÞ, since the corresponding values deliver a higher than zero expected utility.
Finally, we halve the value of the sender's reputation from an initial ¼ 1. In this case, if the sender has full credibility but lacks reputation, DMs may purchase a product randomly but expect a lower utility derived from such a purchase than the one guaranteed by the sender. This is the case represented in the set of simulations within Fig. 4 . Clearly, and due to the exact same reasons outlined in the previous setting, a decrease inÊ 2 leads to an upper shift of the FðÁÞ function while leaving H ðÁÞ una®ected. At the same time, the ability of DMs to eliminate all uncertainty i It should be noted that the vertical lines joining the discontinuous pieces of the corresponding H ðÁÞ functions have been added to allow for a more intuitive graphical presentation and to simplify comparisons between markets. from FðÁÞ by gathering a second observation leads to an increase in search aversion as H ðÁÞ shifts downwards due to the decrease in the value of E 2 caused by the loss of reputation. Thus, an immediate conclusion derived from our normative information gathering framework is that the ability of a sender to impose any initially displayed product as a plausible choice among rational DMs decreases in his reputation. That is, a decrease in the sender's reputation allows for negative signals aboutÊ 2 to have a positive e®ect on the FðÁÞ function de¯ned within the unsignaled market. It should be emphasized that we are assuming the signals issued by a sender to be fully credible, an assumption that, if relaxed, would weaken the strength of the shift in FðÁÞ, leading to DMs that are harder to manipulate. The previous result may initially seem counterintuitive, a thought that vanishes upon further re°ection. Note that, for the sender to increase the expected search utility derived from continuing gathering information on the product observed within the unsignaled market, the certainty equivalent product expected to be obtained from the signaled one must allow for an improvement upon the certainty equivalent product o®ered by the sender. In the full credibility case, this requirement cannot be met. That is, negative signals released on the alternative market make the DM eager to accept products that would otherwise be located below the certainty equivalent o®ered by the sender, which decreases his expected search utility from continuing gathering information on an initially observed product. However, if the reputation of the sender decreases to the point where such signals induce the DM to accept products that improve upon the certainty equivalent value expected to be obtained within the unsignaled market, then veri¯ability leads to an increase in the expected search utility derived from FðÁÞ. Note that the fundamental force behind this e®ect is the ability of the DM to verify the second characteristic of the product under consideration, while being unable to observe any characteristic from the products located within the signaled market. Thus, despite his ability to verify the characteristics of the product being purchased, we have seen how the DM may be induced to consider purchasing any product initially ofered by the sender, independently of the value of its X 1 realization. j We are not the¯rst ones to consider the potential positive e®ects derived from negative reviews. Reference 52 show how negative publicity may increase the likelihood of purchase by increasing awareness about the corresponding product. Thus, as argued by these authors, negative publicity has di®erent e®ects depending on whether the product being considered is an already established or a relatively unknown one. In our setting, as illustrated above, the capacity of information senders to impose their respective products through negative signals follows directly from their (lower) reputation.
Information acquisition costs
Through the previous analysis we have omitted the information acquisition costs that are generally assumed on the side of DMs within the operations research and economics literatures. However, information acquisition costs can be easily accounted for within the current formal environment. The search costs incurred when observing the second characteristic of a given product are generally assumed to be lower than those derived from starting acquiring information on the¯rst characteristic of a new product. Thus, given this di®erence in search costs between characteristics and among products, we analyze how di®erent information acquisition costs a®ect the information gathering and choice behavior of DMs.
In order to illustrate this point, we denote by c 1 and c 2 the costs of acquiring information on the¯rst and second characteristics from a product, respectively. We assume that c 1 > c 2 , in order to account for the lower costs incurred when observing the second characteristic of a product relative to the¯rst one. The resulting functions FðÁÞ and H ðÁÞ absent signals and given full credibility and reputation on the side of the information sender are given by
The immediate intuition derived from these equations in search theoretical terms is the emergence of a market captivity e®ect that favors the product observed initially. This e®ect follows from the relatively larger cost of shifting between market products when compared to the cost from continuing acquiring information on the initial product. This is illustrated in Fig. 5 , where search costs given by c 1 ¼ 1, c 2 ¼ 0:5 have been introduced within the setting described in Fig. 3, i. e., negative signals issued on X 2 with zero credibility and full reputation on the side of the information sender. Figure 5 shows the downward shift in the corresponding functions FðÁÞ and H ðÁÞ with respect to those described in Fig. 3 . Note the relatively larger shift of H ðÁÞ due to the higher costs incurred when observing a new product. Thus, the larger search costs being incurred when shifting among products will amplify the e®ect of negative signals on the information acquisition behavior of DMs and simplify the manipulation process of the information sender. A similar e®ect would be obtained when considering products composed of three characteristics, as can be intuitively inferred from the analysis presented in Sec. 6.
Signals on X 1
Consider the decision theoretical model described in the previous section but with signals released on the value of E 1 in an alternative market. This scenario is introduced to study how should the DM behave when signals are observed on his most preferred characteristic, which a®ects both expected search utilities directly throughÊ 1 .
The basic e®ects derived from positive and negative signals issued on X 1 are similar to those described in the X 2 scenario. Therefore, the corresponding analysis is omitted in order to concentrate on the di®erences between both settings arising from changes in the reputation and credibility of the sender. Figure 6 represents a normative risk neutral environment where negative signals are released onÊ 1 and ¼ 1=2. As in the X 2 case, this decrement in the reputation of the sender leads the DM to expect half the value of E 1 and E 2 when these characteristics cannot be directly veri¯ed. However, when comparing the current setting with the previous one on X 2 , we observe how veri¯ability prevents full manipulability. This result follows from the di®erences in search aversion between the previous X 2 case, where search aversion was induced 8 x 1 2 X 1 , and the current one on X 1 , where the respective information gathering areas remain almost unchanged. Clearly, the changes induced byÊ 1 on the H ðÁÞ function are what prevents the signaling process from fully manipulating the DM into accepting the product initially displayed by the sender. It is also obvious that the strength of the signals required to manipulate the choice and search processes of DMs is higher than in the X 2 case. This is due to the fact that theÊ 1 value induced by the signals is much closer to the original [unsignaled] one than that induced on X 2 , whose wider domain allows for larger expected value improvements.
The main conclusion following from these simulations is, however, the fact that the changes induced by the signals on H ðÁÞ decrease the ability of the sender to manipulate the choices made by DMs. This result is particularly evident in the zero credibility case presented in Fig. 7 , where the sender is unable to shift the information gathering process of the DM in the desired direction.
Finally, note that, in both these previous settings, negative signals shift the H ðÁÞ function upwards. This is due to the same reason why identical signals would not 
Thus, as long as the products contained within this set provide the DM with an expected utility higher than E 1 þ E 2 , after reputation is accounted for, the expected search utility delivered by H ðÁÞ increases. It is indeed this value improvement, due to the decrease in the credibility and reputation of the sender, what prevents complete manipulation from taking place within the current setting.
Note, however, that it was indeed the lack of credibility and reputation what allowed for manipulation in the X 2 case. The existing di®erences in the¯nal result between both scenarios follow from the e®ect of the X 1 variable on the H ðÁÞ function, which was absent in the X 2 setting. 
On Products Composed of Three Characteristics
This section provides an analysis and intuition regarding the extension of the framework introduced in the paper to products composed of three characteristics. As it will become evident through the analysis, considering products composed of more than three characteristics would require operating within a space of a dimension equal to the number of characteristics being considered. In this case, heuristic mechanisms should be introduced to reduce the dimension of the resulting model and improve its k It should be emphasized that similar results would also be obtained within a risk averse frame-work. In this case, however, search aversion would increase relative to the linear risk neutral case, an e®ect already described in Ref. 45 . operability. This is also the case when analyzing the acquisition of more than two pieces of information by DMs within the current theoretical setting. 53 When acquiring information sequentially on products composed of three characteristics, DMs have to compute their optimal gathering behavior through the di®erent stages of the process on which they are located. That is, the di®erent information acquisition trade-o®s faced by DMs depend on the characteristics already observed from a given subset of products. These potential combinations can be described as follows:
(0-0) Initial acquisition of information stage: no information has been acquired from any product. (1-0) The DM has observed the¯rst characteristic from an initial product and must decide whether to continue acquiring information on the product initially observed or to start acquiring information on a new product. (1-1) The DM has observed the¯rst characteristic from two products and must decide whether to continue acquiring information on any of these products or to start acquiring information on a new product. (2-0) The DM has observed the¯rst and second characteristics from an initial product and must decide whether to acquire information on the¯nal characteristic of the product initially observed or to start acquiring information on a new product. (2-1) The DM has observed the¯rst and second characteristics from an initial product and the¯rst characteristic from a di®erent product. The DM must decide among the following options:
(i) acquiring information on the¯nal characteristic of the product initially observed, (ii) observing the second characteristic from the product whose¯rst characteristic has already been observed, (iii) start acquiring information on a third new product.
(2-2) The DM has observed the¯rst and second characteristics from two products and must decide whether to acquire information on the¯nal characteristic of any of these products or to start acquiring information on a new product.
Note that in all of these potential information acquisition stages, starting to observe a new product constitutes an alternative to continuing with any of the products observed previously. We analyze the (2-0) and (1-1) subcases formally below. The intuition is similar to that of the bidimensional products setting, but the set of potential combinations of characteristics that must be considered by DMs increases considerably. We will illustrate numerically the behavior of the resulting functions FðÁÞ and H ðÁÞ in two of the quadrants composing the (2-0) subcase. The remaining subcases can be easily derived from combining the two described below, but a formal description of the entire information acquisition process would require an analysis of its own beyond the scope of the current paper.
Choice Manipulation Through Comparability 363 6.1. The (2-0) subcase The (2-0) subcase studies the trade-o® faced by a DM after having acquired information on the¯rst and second characteristics from a given product. The DM must decide between acquiring information on the third characteristic of the product observed and starting acquiring information on a new product. The notation follows directly from that employed through the paper, with the subindex \three" referring to the third characteristic of the product under consideration. This subindex will also be used to di®erentiate the functions FðÁÞ and H ðÁÞ corresponding to the current setting from those de¯ned for bidimensional products in the previous sections of the paper.
The integration intervals required to de¯ne the corresponding function FðÁÞ follow from
ð6:1Þ
for any possible x 1 and x 2 values observed by the DM. Thus, F :
ð6:3Þ
This function must be represented on a three-dimensional space de¯ned for all possible realizations of x 1 and x 2 . It will be used to determine the information acquisition behavior of the DM when considering all the potential realizations of x 3 . The intuition is identical to that de¯ning the function FðÁÞ within the bidimensional product setting.
Consider now the corresponding function H ðÁÞ, whose integration intervals follow from
ð6:4Þ
ð6:5Þ
Note that in the bidimensional product case described in Sec. 3 the integration intervals were based on In that case, the DM had to consider the possibility of improving upon a unique observed characteristic from a given product. That is, the only comparable characteristics were de¯ned on X 1 . Thus, the resulting integration intervals were based on the maximum value between the observed x 1 realization and the certainty equivalent ce 1 .
In the current setting, the DM must compare the characteristic that may be observed from a new product with those two already observed from the initial product. Thus, all potential combinations leading to improvements over both the partially observed initial product and the certainty equivalent one must be considered. In this case, the new product observed must improve upon ce 1 , with the DM computing whether or not its expected combination with the ce 2 value improves also upon the initially observed product.
The resulting function H : Q i 2 X i ! R is therefore de¯ned as follows The reference parameter values describing X 1 and X 2 are those used in the numerical computation of the bidimensional setting. The third characteristic is described by the following parameter values:
As a result, when de¯ning the corresponding function FðÁÞ, Area 1 in Fig. 8 is conditioned by the fact that P þ ðx 1 ; x 2 Þ ¼ ; for all realizations of x 1 and x 2 within it. Similarly, Area 3 is conditioned by P À ðx 1 ; x 2 Þ ¼ ;. Trivially, P þ ðx 1 ; x 2 Þ 6 ¼ ; and P À ðx 1 ; x 2 Þ 6 ¼ ; within Area 2. The same type of reasoning applies when de¯ning the function H ðÁÞ. That is, Area 1 in Fig. 9 is conditioned by the fact that u 1 ðx 1 Þ þ u 2 ðx 2 Þ E 1 þ E 2 , while within Area 3 we have
Finally, within Area 2 we have that u 1 ðy triangles. This overlapping generates uncertainty regarding the information acquisition and choice behavior of DMs. This uncertainty is completely eliminated by the signal through the corresponding quadrant. It should however be highlighted that the initial overlapping between both functions described in Fig. 12 opens the way for further strategic scenarios to be considered together with a link to the literature on fuzzy sets and decision making. The (1-1) subcase studies the trade-o® faced by a DM after having acquired information on the¯rst characteristic from two di®erent products. The DM must decide between acquiring information on the second characteristic from one of the partially observed products and starting acquiring information on a new (third) product. De¯ne the highest utility derived from the¯rst characteristics of the two products observed as u 1 ð b x 1 Þ ¼ maxfu 1 ðx 11 Þ; u 1 ðx 21 Þg, with x 11 and x 21 being the¯rst characteristic from the¯rst and the second product observed, respectively. The function F : X 1 ! R is therefore given by
ð6:9Þ
Note that in the F 3 ðx 1 Þ case the DM either¯nds a product whose second characteristic combined with b x 1 provides a higher utility than the certainty equivalent one or, if this were not the case, then the highest between the remaining partially observed product and the certainty equivalent one would be chosen.
An alternative de¯nition would require the product whose second characteristic is observed to improve also upon minfu 1 ðx 11 Þ; u 1 ðx 21 Þg þ E 2 whenever this remaining product delivers an expected utility higher than E 1 þ E 2 . That is, the function Choice Manipulation Through Comparability 369 F : X 1 ! R could alternatively be de¯ned as follows The choice between both F 3 ðx 1 Þ alternatives depends on the degree of sophistication we want to endow the DM with.
Similarly, given x 1 ¼ maxf b x 1 ; E 1 g, the function H : X 1 ! R is de¯ned as follows
ð6:11Þ
Both functions will determine the optimal information acquisition behavior of DMs within this stage, which, as it is clear from the respective de¯nitions, follows an almost identical intuition as the one described in the bidimensional product setting.
Conclusions and Extensions
The main conclusion to be derived from this paper is that an information sender can issue (unveri¯able) signals on products located in alternative markets so as to manipulate the choice of uninformed but perfectly rational DMs, even when the latter are able to verify the characteristics of the products o®ered by the sender. We have illustrated how, in order for the sender to be able to manipulate the choice and information gathering processes of DMs in the desired direction, he should release signals on characteristics that di®er from the most preferred ones.
The results obtained provide a strategic dimension to the information acquisition process of DMs. Thus, the strategic nature of information transmission processes should be explicitly analyzed in¯elds that do not currently account for it, such as knowledge management. 54 This is particularly important at the organizational level, where relatively small sets of decision variables are generally considered, 55 and trust constitutes an essential element of the organizations performance. 56 In addition, the results obtained allow for a formal treatment of the optimal acquisition of information and choice processes studied by the consumer choice literature, where the strategic side of information transmission is rarely formalized. [3] [4] [5] 37 Moreover, the set of potential strategic scenarios arising from the inability of DMs to initially di®erentiate information senders based on their reputation should be studied. 57 This theoretical possibility should re°ect recent empirical phenomena such as the Amazon sock puppet scandal, where book authors issued their own reviews to the¯rm's website. 58 An immediate extension of the current paper should aim at analyzing the implications resulting from strategic information transmission processes within oligopolistic scenarios, spreading into the game theoretical branches of economics and operations research developed by Refs. 59 and 60. For example, it seems plausible to assume that after gathering both pieces of information, DMs decide to purchase (one of) the product(s) observed if and only if it provides them with an expected utility higher than E 1 þ E 2 absent reputation frictions. However, if several senders located in di®erent markets are considered, then the resulting set of signaling games would require further threshold modi¯cations based on the reputation and credibility of the corresponding senders and the signals they release.
